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A polynomial algorithm for the maximum clique
Ioannis Avramopoulos
In this paper, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for the maximum clique problem, which
implies P = NP. Our algorithm works with a continuous representation of this problem that is
parametrized and uses an equilibrium computation engine that, depending on the value of the
parameter, either detects a “maximum-clique equilibrium” or decides that such an equilibrium
does not exist (for that parameter). From a technical perspective, one of our contributions is
to transform an equilibrium fully polynomial-time approximation scheme to a polynomial-time
equilibrium computation algorithm for the continuous representation we are working with.
1 Introduction
“You want forever, always or never.”
— The Pierces
The clique problem is, given a positive integer k, to decide ifG has a clique of size k. This decision
problem is NP-complete [Karp, 1972]. In this paper, we present a polynomial-time algorithm for
the corresponding NP-hard optimization problem (given an undirected graph G, find a maximum
clique in G). Our approach draws on the power of characterizations. In this vein, by adapting
a theorem of Motzkin and Strauss [1965] and building on [Etessami and Lochbihler, 2008], Nisan
[2006] constructs a game-theoretic transformation (characterization) of the clique problem that
receives as input an undirected graph and gives as output a doubly symmetric bimatrix game (that
is, a bimatrix game where the payoff matrix of each player is the transpose of that of the other and
the payoff matrix is also symmetric) whose structure contains the answer we are looking for. We
refer to the payoff matrix of the game Nisan designed as the Nisan-Bomze payoff matrix.1
Ubiquitous in nature is the notion of equilibrium. Computing equilibria in games (that is, Nash
equilibria) had been conjectured to be hard [Daskalakis et al., 2009, Chen et al., 2009]. However,
Nash equilibria are manifestations of solutions of variational inequalities such as the Stampacchia
and Minty variational inequalities [Facchinei and Pang, 2003], a mathematical formalization whose
origins can be traced to physics. This perspective in itself renders the fundamental principles of
mainstream complexity theory questionable, as thinking that nature cannot compute equilibria
efficiently is weird: The cosmos is not random.2
In this paper, we are not concerned with a problem of equilibrium computation per se (although
we draw on an equilibrium computation algorithm) but rather with one of testing the evolutionary
character of an equilibrium strategy: A distinctive property of the Nisan game is that a certain pure
strategy, called strategy 0 (and denoted E0 in this paper), is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS)
1As for the reason, we refer to [Bomze et al., 1999] for a technique Nisan uses in his construction.
2I would like to credit Costis Daskalakis and Christos Papadimitriou, chiefly the latter, for firmly establishing,
in their efforts to disseminate results that were obtained in collaboration with Paul Goldberg, a line of academic
discourse that enabled, from my perspective, the development of rigorous physical intuition for complexity theoretic
concepts. They got the answer wrong in many respects, but the debate they initiated was important.
if and only if a parameter of the Nisan-Bomze payoff matrix (which we call the Nisan parameter)
exceeds the size of a maximum clique of the graph being represented in the matrix.
The ESS has its origins in mathematical biology [Maynard Smith and Price, 1973, Maynard Smith,
1982] but it admits a characterization [Hofbauer et al., 1979] more prolific in our setting: An ESS
is an isolated equilibrium point that exerts an “attractive force” in a neighborhood. The latter per-
spective enables a variety of techniques for testing the “evolutionary character” of an equilibrium
in the interest of classifying it as an ESS. One technique that seemed promising is to apply the
Lyapunov stability criterion to a linearization of an evolutionary dynamic that an ESS attracts.
One such dynamic is the replicator dynamic whose linearization is studied in [Sandholm, 2010,
Chapter 8.4]. Alas the linearized dynamical system is not necessarily hyperbolic (in that zero may
appear as an eigenvalue), rendering the Jacobian eigenvalue test inconclusive.
Our algorithm works by distinguishing in polynomial time between two cases, namely, E0 is an
ESS and E0 is an NSS (neutrally stable strategy) but not an ESS. In the former case, E0 is the
unique equilibrium of the Nisan game. In the latter case, other equilibria appear. To detect the
presence of such other equilibria we use an equilibrium computation algorithm, which is based on
Hedge. Our analysis draws on equilibrium approximation bounds that apply to the arithmetic mean
of the iterates Hedge generates. These bounds were obtained in a related paper [Avramopoulos,
2020] showing that P = PPAD.
One of our contributions in this paper is to transform the equilibrium fully polynomial-time
approximation scheme presented in that paper to a polynomial equilibrium computation algorithm
for the Nisan game. To that end, we introduce a new definition, namely, that of the “minimum
positive gap” of a symmetric bimatrix game (C,CT ) (C being the payoff matrix). The minimum
positive gap is a lower bound on the difference (CX)max − (CX)min over all strategies X in the
“basis game” C and its subgames. We prove that the minimum positive gap of the Nisan game
is 1/2, which enables us to configure the parameters of our equilibrium computation algorithm to
compute an equilibrium other than E0 if it exists.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss bimatrix games, sym-
metric bimatrix games, doubly symmetric bimatrix games, equalizers, an equilibrium notion that is
instrumental in the Nisan game, approximate equilibria and well-supported approximate equilibria,
notions of evolutionary stability, and the Nisan game. Our approach in finding a maximum clique
rests on an equilibrium computation engine using Hedge whose main properties are summarized
in Section 3. In Section 4, we state and prove the main results forming a theoretical basis that
enables a “discriminant test” on the evolutionary character of strategy E0 in the Nisan game. The
main idea in transforming the aforementioned FPTAS to a polynomial equilibrium computation
algorithm is presented in Section 5. Finally, our algorithm for computing a maximum clique in
polynomial time is presented in Section 6, which concludes with our main result that P=NP.
2 Preliminary background on Nash equilibria and the Nisan game
2.1 Bimatrix games and symmetric bimatrix games
A 2-player (bimatrix) game in normal form is specified by a pair of n×m matrices A and B, the
former corresponding to the row player and the latter to the column player. A mixed strategy for
the row player is a probability vector P ∈ Rn and a mixed strategy for the column player is a
probability vector Q ∈ Rm. The payoff to the row player of P against Q is P · AQ and that to
the column player is P · BQ. Denote the space of probability vectors for the row player by P and
for the column player by Q. A Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game (A,B) is a pair of mixed
strategies P ∗ and Q∗ such that all unilateral deviations from these strategies are not profitable,
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that is, for all P ∈ P and Q ∈ Q, we simultaneously have that
P ∗ ·AQ∗ ≥ P ·AQ∗ (1)
P ∗ · BQ∗ ≥ P ∗ · BQ. (2)
(For example, see [von Stengel, 2007].) A,B are called payoff matrices. We denote the set of Nash
equilibria of the bimatrix game (A,B) by NE(A,B). If B = AT , where AT is the transpose of
matrix A, the bimatrix game is called a symmetric bimatrix game. Let (C,CT ) be a symmetric
bimatrix game. We denote the space of symmetric bimatrix games by C. Cˆ denotes the space of
payoff matrices whose entries lie in the range [0, 1]. Pure strategies are denoted either as i or as
Ei, where Ei is a probability vector whose mass is concentrated in position i. X(C) denotes the
space of mixed strategies of (C,CT ) (a probability simplex). We call (P ∗, Q∗) ∈ NE(C,CT ) a
symmetric equilibrium if P ∗ = Q∗. If (X∗,X∗) is a symmetric equilibrium, we call X∗ a symmetric
equilibrium strategy. It follows from (1) and (2) that a symmetric (Nash) equilibrium strategy
X∗ ∈ X(C) satisfies
∀X ∈ X(C) : (X∗ −X) · CX∗ ≥ 0.
NE+(C) denotes the symmetric equilibrium strategies of (C,CT ). We denote the (relative) interior
of X(C) by X˚(C) (every pure strategy in X˚(C) has probability mass). Let X ∈ X(C). We define
the support or carrier of X by
C(X) ≡ {i ∈ K(C)|X(i) > 0}.
A doubly symmetric bimatrix game [Weibull, 1995, p.26] is a symmetric bimatrix game whose
payoff matrix, say C, is symmetric, that is C = CT . Symmetric equilibria in doubly symmetric
games are KKT points of a standard quadratic program (cf. [Bomze, 1998]):
maximize X · CX
subject to X ∈ X(C).
X · CX is the potential function of the game.
2.2 Equalizers: Definition and basic properties
Definition 1. X∗ ∈ X(C) is called an equalizer if
∀X ∈ X(C) : (X∗ −X) · CX∗ = 0.
We denote the set of equalizers of C by E(C).
Note that E(C) ⊆ NE+(C). Equalizers generalize interior symmetric equilibrium strategies, as
every such strategy is an equalizer, but there exist symmetric bimatrix games with a non-interior
equalizer (for example, if a column of C is constant, the corresponding pure strategy of C is an
equalizer of C). Note that an equalizer can be computed in polynomial time by solving the linear
(feasibility) program (LP)
(CX)1 = · · · = (CX)n,
n∑
i=1
X(i) = 1, X ≥ 0,
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which we may equivalently write as
CX = c1, 1TX = 1, X ≥ 0,
where 1 is a column vector of ones of appropriate dimension. We may write this problem as a
standard LP as follows: Let
A
.
=
[
C −1
1T 0
]
and Y
.
=
[
X
c
]
.
then
AY =
[
C −1
1T 0
] [
X
c
]
=
[
CX − c1
1TX
]
,
and the standard form of our LP, assuming C > 0, is[
CX − c1
1TX
]
=
[
0
1
]
,X ≥ 0, c ≥ 0 (3)
where 0 is a column vector of zeros of appropriate dimension. We immediately obtain that:
Lemma 1. E(C) is a convex set.
Proof. The set of feasible/optimal solutions of a linear program is a convex set. Let
Y∗ =
{
[XT c]T |[XT c]T is a feasible solution to (3)} .
Then Y∗ is convex and therefore the set
X∗ =
{
X|[XT c]T is a feasible solution to (3)}
is also convex since c is unique provided the LP is feasible.
We can actually show something stronger:
Lemma 2. If X∗1 ,X
∗
2 ∈ E(C) then Λ(X∗1 ,X∗2 ) ⊆ E(C), where
Λ(X∗1 ,X
∗
2 ) = {(1− λ)X∗1 + λX∗2 ∈ X(C)|λ ∈ R} .
Proof. Assume X∗1 ,X
∗
2 ∈ E(C). Then, by the definition of an equalizer,
∀X ∈ X(C) : X∗1 · CX∗1 = X · CX∗1 and
∀X ∈ X(C) : X∗2 · CX∗2 = X · CX∗2 .
Let
Y ∗ = (1− λ)X∗1 + λX∗2 , λ ∈ R.
Then
Y ∗ · CY ∗ = (1− λ) ((1− λ)X∗1 + λX∗2 ) · CX∗1 + λ ((1− λ)X∗1 + λX∗2 ) · CX∗2
= (1− λ)X∗1 · CX∗1 + λX∗2 · CX∗2
= (1− λ)X · CX∗1 + λX · CX∗2
= X · C ((1− λ)X∗1 + λX∗2 )
= X · CY ∗.
Since X is arbitrary, the proof is complete.
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2.3 Approximate and well-supported approximate equilibria
As mentioned earlier, conditions (1) and (2) simplify as follows for a symmetric equilibrium strategy
X∗:
∀X ∈ X(C) : (X∗ −X) · CX∗ ≥ 0.
An ǫ-approximate symmetric equilibrium, say X∗, is defined as follows:
∀X ∈ X(C) : (X∗ −X) · CX∗ ≥ −ǫ.
We may equivalently write the previous expression as
(CX∗)max −X∗ · CX∗ ≤ ǫ,
where
(CX∗)max = max{Y · CX∗|Y ∈ X(C)}.
Let us now give an important result on approximate equilibria. To that end, we need a definition:
Definition 2. (X∗, Y ∗) is an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium of (A,B) if
Ei · AY ∗ > Ek · AY ∗ + ǫ⇒ X∗(k) = 0 and
X∗ ·BEj > X∗ ·BEk + ǫ⇒ Y ∗(k) = 0.
Definition 2 is due to Daskalakis et al. [2009]. We note that an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilib-
rium of (A,B) is necessarily an ǫ-approximate equilibrium of (A,B) but the converse is not generally
true. However, given an approximate equilibrium we can obtain a well-supported equilibrium:
Proposition 1. Let (A,B) be such that 0 ≤ A,B ≤ 1. Given an ǫ2/8-approximate Nash equilibrium
of (A,B), where 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1, we can find an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium in polynomial time.
The previous proposition is due to [Chen et al., 2009] motivated by a related result in [Daskalakis et al.,
2009]. We have the following characterization of well-supported equilibria:
Proposition 2. (X∗, Y ∗) is an ǫ-well-supported Nash equilibrium of (A,B) if and only if
X∗(i) > 0⇒ Ei · AY ∗ ≥ mmax
k=1
Ek ·AY ∗ − ǫ and
Y ∗(j) > 0⇒ X∗ ·BEj ≥ nmax
ℓ=1
X∗ · BEℓ − ǫ.
Proof. The statement of the lemma is just the contrapositive of Definition 2.
2.4 Evolutionary stability
An equilibrium notion in symmetric bimatrix games (and, therefore, also in doubly symmetric
bimatrix games) of primary interest in this paper is the GESS (global evolutionarily stable strategy),
which is a global version of the ESS [Maynard Smith and Price, 1973, Maynard Smith, 1982]. Of
primary interest are aslo related equilibrium notions such as the NSS (neutrally stable strategy)
and GNSS (global NSS). These concepts admit the following definitions:
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Definition 3. Let C ∈ C. We say X∗ ∈ X(C) is an ESS, if
∃O ⊆ X(C) ∀X ∈ O/{X∗} : X∗ · CX > X · CX.
Here O is a neighborhood of X∗. If O coincides with X(C), we say X∗ is a GESS. If the above
inequality is weak we have an NSS and a GNSS respectively.
The aforementioned definition of an ESS was originally obtained as a characterization [Hofbauer et al.,
1979]. Note that an NSS, and, therefore, also an ESS, is necessarily a symmetric equilibrium strat-
egy. The ESS and NSS admit the following characterizations. These characterizations correspond
to how they were initially defined.
Proposition 3. X∗ is an ESS of (C,CT ) if and only if the following conditions hold simultaneously
X∗ · CX∗ ≥ X · CX∗, ∀X ∈ X(C), and
X∗ · CX∗ = X · CX∗ ⇒ X∗ · CX > X · CX, ∀X ∈ X(C) such that X 6= X∗.
An NSS correspond to a weak inequality.
The characterization of the ESS and NSS in Proposition 3 does not readily yield the global
versions of GESS and GNSS that are of primary interest in this paper. Note finally that:
Lemma 3. If X∗ is an equalizer, then X∗ is an ESS if and only if it is a GESS.
Proof. Straightforward from Proposition 3.
Similarly:
Lemma 4. If X∗ is an equalizer, then X∗ is an NSS if and only if it is a GNSS.
2.5 The Nisan game
2.5.1 The Nisan-Bomze payoff matrix
Given an undirected graph G(V,E), where |V | = n, and an integer 1 < k ≤ n, consider the
following (n+ 1)× (n+ 1) symmetric matrix C: C’s rows and columns correspond to the vertices
of V , numbered 1 to n, with an additional row and column, numbered 0.
• For 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n: C(i, j) = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E and C(i, j) = 0 if (i, j) 6∈ E.
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ n: C(i, i) = 1/2.
• For 1 ≤ i ≤ n: C(0, i) = C(i, 0) = 1− 1/(2k).
• C(0, 0) = 1− 1/(2k).
We refer to this matrix as the Nisan-Bomze payoff matrix. We call k the Nisan parameter.
Considering the doubly symmetric bimatrix game whose payoff matrix is C, one of Nisan’s main
results [Nisan, 2006] is that strategy 0 (which we also denote by E0) is an ESS if and only if the
maximum clique of G is less than k. Note that E0 is an equalizer and, therefore, it is an ESS if
and only if it is a GESS (cf. Lemma 3). We denote by Cˆ the n × n matrix obtained from C by
excluding strategy 0.
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2.5.2 Maximum-clique equilibria
If E0 is a GESS it is easily shown that it is the unique equilibrium in the corresponding game. If the
Nisan parameter is equal to the size of the maximum clique, then other equilibria appear, namely,
an equilibrium for every maximum clique (which is a global maximizer of the quadratic potential
such as E0 is) and a corresponding equilibrium line (of global maximizers) with terminal points E0
and the respective maximum-clique equilibrium. We use in the sequel the fact that maximum-clique
equilibria are uniform strategies in their support (the pure strategies corresponding to the vertices
forming a maximum clique).
The challenge in finding a maximum clique is to compute an equilibrium other than E0 in the
event that E0 is a GNSS but not a GESS. To that end, we need an “equilibrium computation
engine.” In the next section, we review recent results on equilibrium computation in symmetric
bimatrix games.
3 Summary of recent equilibrium computation results
Our equilibrium computation algorithm is based on Hedge [Freund and Schapire, 1997, 1999] that
induces the following map in the setting of a symmetric bimatrix game:
Ti(X) = X(i) · exp {αEi · CX}∑n
j=1X(j) exp {αEj · CX}
, i = 1, . . . , n, (4)
where C is the payoff matrix of a symmetric bimatrix game, n is the number of pure strategies,
Ei is the probability vector corresponding to pure strategy i, and X(i) is the probability mass of
pure strategy i. Parameter α is called the learning rate, which has the role of a step size in our
equilibrium computation setting. In this paper, we do not study the behavior of the iterates that
T generates per se but instead the sequence
{
X¯K
}∞
K=0
of empirical averages of the iterates that T
generates starting from an interior to the probability simplex strategy. The empirical average X¯K
at iteration K = 0, 1, 2, . . . is a simple arithmetic mean
X¯K =
1
K + 1
K∑
k=0
Xk.
This section summarizes related to this paper results that were obtained elsewhere [Avramopoulos,
2018, 2020].
3.1 The multiplicative weights convexity lemma
Part of our analysis of the dynamic behavior of Hedge in the Nisan game relies on the relative
entropy function between probability distributions (also called Kullback-Leibler divergence). The
relative entropy between the n× 1 probability vectors P > 0 (that is, for all i = 1, . . . , n, P (i) > 0)
and Q > 0 is given by
RE(P,Q)
.
=
n∑
i=1
P (i) ln
P (i)
Q(i)
.
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However, this definition can be relaxed: The relative entropy between n× 1 probability vectors P
and Q such that, given P , for all Q ∈ {Q ∈ X|C(P ) ⊂ C(Q)}, is
RE(P,Q)
.
=
∑
i∈C(P )
P (i) ln
P (i)
Q(i)
.
Some well-known properties of the relative entropy function are stated in [Weibull, 1995, p.96]. With
this background in mind, we state the following lemma (which we refer to as the “multiplicative
weights convexity lemma”) generalizing [Freund and Schapire, 1999, Lemma 2]. It was stated and
proven elsewhere but we show the proof for completeness.
Lemma 5 ([Avramopoulos, 2018]). Let T be as in (4). Then
∀X ∈ X˚(C) ∀Y ∈ X(C) : RE(Y, T (X)) is a convex function of α.
Proof. Let Xˆ ≡ T (X). We have
d
dα
RE(Y, Xˆ) =
=
d
dα

 ∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i) ln
(
Y (i)
Xˆ(i)
)

=
d
dα

 ∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i) ln
(
Y (i) ·
∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
X(i) exp{α(CX)i}
)
=
d
dα

 ∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i) ln
(∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
X(i) exp{α(CX)i}
)

=
∑
i∈C(Y )
Y (i)
d
dα
(
ln
(∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
X(i) exp{α(CX)i}
))
.
Furthermore, using (·)′ as alternative notation (abbreviation) for d/dα(·),
d
dα
(
ln
(∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
X(i) exp{α(CX)i}
))
=
X(i) exp{α(CX)i}∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
(∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
X(i) exp{α(CX)i}
)′
and (∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
X(i) exp{α(CX)i}
)′
=
∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)j exp{α(CX)j}X(i) exp{α(CX)i}
(X(i) exp{α(CX)i})2
−
− X(i)(CX)i
∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j} exp{α(CX)i}
(X(i) exp{α(CX)i})2
=
=
∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)j exp{α(CX)j}}
X(i) exp{α(CX)i} −
− (CX)i
∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}}
X(i) exp{α(CX)i} .
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Therefore,
d
dα
RE(Y, Xˆ) =
∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)j exp{α(CX)j}∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
− Y · CX. (5)
Furthermore,
d2
dα2
RE(Y, Xˆ) =
(∑n
j=1X(j)((CX)j)
2 exp{α(CX)j}
)(∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
)
(∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
)2 −
−
(∑n
j=1X(j)((CX)j) exp{α(CX)j}
)2
(∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
)2 .
Jensen’s inequality implies that
∑n
j=1X(j)((CX)j)
2 exp{α(CX)j}∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
≥
(∑n
j=1X(j)((CX)j) exp{α(CX)j}∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
)2
,
which is equivalent to the numerator of the second derivative being nonnegative asX is a probability
vector. Note that the inequality is strict unless
∀i, j ∈ C(X) : (CX)i = (CX)j .
This completes the proof.
In the next pair of lemmas we use the following “secant inequality” for a convex function F (·)
and its derivative F ′(·):
∀ b > a : F ′(a) ≤ F (b)− F (a)
b− a ≤ F
′(b). (6)
Lemma 6. Let C ∈ Cˆ. Then, for all Y ∈ X(C) and for all X ∈ X˚(C), we have that
∀α > 0 : RE(Y, T (X)) ≤ RE(Y,X) − α(Y −X) · CX + α(exp{α} − 1).
Proof. Since, by Lemma 5, RE(Y, T (X)) − RE(Y,X) is a convex function of α, we have by the
aforementioned secant inequality that, for α > 0,
RE(Y, T (X)) −RE(Y,X) ≤ α (RE(Y, T (X)) −RE(Y,X))′ = α · d
dα
RE(Y, T (X)) (7)
where it can be readily computed that
d
dα
RE(Y, T (X)) =
∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)j exp{α(CX)j}∑n
j=1X(j) exp{α(CX)j}
− Y · CX.
Using Jensen’s inequality in the previous expression, we obtain
d
dα
RE(Y, T (X)) ≤
∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)j exp{α(CX)j}
exp{αX · CX} − Y · CX. (8)
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Note now that
exp{αx} ≤ 1 + (exp{α} − 1)x, x ∈ [0, 1],
an inequality used in [Freund and Schapire, 1999, Lemma 2]. Using the latter inequality, we obtain
from (8) that
d
dα
RE(Y, T (X)) ≤ X · CX
exp{αX · CX} − Y · CX + (exp{α} − 1)
∑n
j=1X(j)(CX)
2
j
exp{αX · CX}
and since exp{αX · CX} ≥ 1 again by the assumption that C ∈ Cˆ, we have
d
dα
RE(Y, T (X)) ≤ X · CX − Y · CX + (exp{α} − 1)
n∑
j=1
X(j)(CX)2j .
Noting that
∑
X(j)(CX)2j ≤ 1 and combining with (7) yields the lemma.
As a corollary to the previous lemma, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Let C ∈ Cˆ. Then, for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and for all X ∈ X˚(C), we have that
∀α > 0 : ln(Ti(X)) ≥ ln(X(i)) + α(Ei −X) · CX − α(exp{α} − 1).
Proof. Simple implication of Lemma 6 noting that RE(Ei,X) = − ln(X(i)).
Lemma 7. Let C ∈ Cˆ. Then, for all Y ∈ X(C) and for all X ∈ X˚(C), we have that
∀α > 0 : RE(Y, T (X)) ≥ RE(Y,X) − α(Y −X) · CX.
Proof. Since, by Lemma 5, RE(Y, T (X)) − RE(Y,X) is a convex function of α, we have by the
aforementioned secant inequality that, for all α > 0,
RE(Y, T (X)) −RE(Y,X) ≥ α d
dα
(RE(Y, T (X)) −RE(Y,X)) |α=0 = −α(Y −X) · CX
as claimed.
As a corollary to the previous lemma, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Let C ∈ Cˆ. Then, for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n} and for all X ∈ X˚(C), we have that
∀α > 0 : ln(Ti(X)) ≤ ln(X(i)) + α(Ei −X) · CX.
Proof. Simple implication of Lemma 7 noting that RE(Ei,X) = − ln(X(i)).
3.2 Equilibrium computation using Hedge
Let us put together a compendium of results on equilibrium computation using Hedge that are
useful in the sequel.
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Proposition 6. [Avramopoulos, 2020, Theorem 1] Let C ∈ Cˆ and Xk ≡ T k(X0), where X0 ∈ X˚(C)
is the uniform distribution. Assume the learning rate α > 0 is constant. Then considering the
sequence of empirical averages {
1
K + 1
K∑
k=0
Xk ≡ X¯K
}∞
K=0
,
every limit point of this sequence is an n(exp{α} − 1)-approximate symmetric equilibrium strategy
of C, where n is the number of pure strategies of C.
Proposition 7. [Avramopoulos, 2020, Lemma 6] Under the assumptions of Proposition 6,
(CX¯K)max − X¯K · CX¯K ≤ − 1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=1
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
+
1
K + 1
.
Proposition 8. [Avramopoulos, 2020, Lemma 7] Under the assumptions of Proposition 6, the
sequence {Xk(j)} of probability masses corresponding to pure strategy j ∈ {1, . . . , n} satisfies the
following relation
− 1
α(K + 1)
X¯K(j) ln
(
XK(j)
) ≤− 1
α(K + 1)
(
1
K + 1
K∑
k=0
Xk(j) ln
(
Xk(j)
))
+ (exp{α} − 1) + ρK ,
where ρ = 1/2.
Proposition 9. [Avramopoulos, 2020, Lemma 8] Under the assumptions of Proposition 6, the
sequence of empirical averages {
1
K + 1
K∑
k=0
Xk ≡ X¯K
}∞
K=0
,
satisfies the following relation
(CX¯K)max − X¯K · CX¯K ≤ n exp{−1}
α(K + 1)
+
1
K + 1
+
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
n(exp{α} − 1) +
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
nρK .
(9)
Proposition 10. [Avramopoulos, 2020, Lemma 9] Under the assumptions of Proposition 6, for all
θ > 0, in
K =
⌊
n exp{−1}+ 1 + α
αθ
⌋
(10)
iterations, we have that
(CX¯K)max − X¯K · CX¯K ≤
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
n(exp{α} − 1) +
(
K + 2
K + 1
)
nρK + θ.
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4 The theoretical basis of detecting maximum-clique equilibria
The following lemma is analogous to [Avramopoulos, 2020, Lemma 4].
Lemma 8. Suppose X0 is the uniform distribution. Then
X∗ · CX¯K − X¯K · CX¯K = 1
α(K + 1)
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln(XK+1(i))− 1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=0
X¯K(j) ln(XK+1(j))
Proof. Let T (X) ≡ Xˆ. Then straight algebra gives
Xˆ(i)
Xˆ(j)
=
X(i)
X(j)
exp{α((CX)i − (CX)j)}
and taking logarithms on both sides we obtain
ln
(
Xˆ(i)
Xˆ(j)
)
= ln
(
X(i)
X(j)
)
+ α((CX)i − (CX)j).
We may write the previous equation as
ln
(
Xk+1(i)
Xk+1(j)
)
= ln
(
Xk(i)
Xk(j)
)
+ α((CXk)i − (CXk)j)
Summing over k = 0, . . . K, we obtain
ln
(
XK+1(i)
XK+1(j)
)
= ln
(
X0(i)
X0(j)
)
+ α
K∑
k=0
((CXk)i − (CXk)j)
and dividing by K + 1 and rearranging, we further obtain
1
α(K + 1)
ln
(
XK+1(i)
XK+1(j)
)
=
1
α(K + 1)
ln
(
X0(i)
X0(j)
)
+ (Ei − Ej) · CX¯K .
Under the assumption X0 is the uniform distribution,
1
α(K + 1)
ln
(
XK+1(i)
XK+1(j)
)
= (Ei − Ej) · CX¯K ,
which implies
1
α(K + 1)
ln
(
XK+1(i)
)− 1
α(K + 1)
ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
= (Ei −Ej) · CX¯K ,
which further implies
1
α(K + 1)
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln
(
XK+1(i)
) − 1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=0
X¯K(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
= (X∗ − X¯K) · CX¯K ,
as claimed.
The following lemma is analogous to [Avramopoulos, 2020, Lemma 5].
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Lemma 9. Suppose X0 is the uniform distribution. Then
X∗ · CX¯K − X¯K+1 · CX¯K = 1
α(K + 1)
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln
(
XK+1(i)
) − 1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
Proof. The proof is directly analogous to the proof of Lemma 8.
Lemma 10. Suppose X0 is the uniform distribution and C ∈ Cˆ. Then
X∗ · CX¯K − X¯K · CX¯K ≥ 1
α(K + 1)
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln
(
XK+1(i)
)−
− 1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
) − 1
K + 2
.
Proof. Since
X¯K+1 =
1
K + 2
XK+1 +
K + 1
K + 2
X¯K
we have
X¯K+1 · CX¯K = 1
K + 2
XK+1 · CX¯K + K + 1
K + 2
X¯K · CX¯K
and, therefore,
X¯K · CX¯K = K + 2
K + 1
X¯K+1 · CX¯K − 1
K + 1
XK+1 · CX¯K ,
which implies
X¯K · CX¯K ≤ K + 2
K + 1
X¯K+1 · CX¯K ,
which, combined with Lemma 9, implies that
X∗ · CX¯K − K + 1
K + 2
X¯K · CX¯K ≥ 1
α(K + 1)
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln
(
XK+1(i)
)−
− 1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
and straight algebra yields
X∗ · CX¯K − X¯K · CX¯K ≥ 1
α(K + 1)
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln
(
XK+1(i)
)−
− 1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
) − 1
K + 2
as claimed.
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The following lemma is analogous to [Avramopoulos, 2020, Lemma 6] (cf. Proposition 7).
Lemma 11. Suppose X0 is the uniform distribution and C ∈ Cˆ. Then
X∗ · CX¯K − X¯K · CX¯K ≤ 1
α(K + 1)
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln
(
XK+1(i)
)−
− 1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
+
1
K + 1
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Lemma 10.
Lemma 12. Let C ∈ Cˆ and X∗ be a maximum-clique equilibrium. We initialize T at the uniform
distribution. Then, for all N = 0, 1, 2, . . . and for all K = 0, 1, . . . , N ,
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln(XK(i)) > (K + 1)
(
1
2
)N  n∑
j=0
X¯K(j) ln(XK(j))

 − α(exp{α}+ 1). (11)
Proof. Given any N = 0, 1, 2, . . ., we use induction on the number K of iterations (up to N). The
basis of the induction corresponds to K = 0. Starting at uniform initialization, we have
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln(X0(i)) =
∑
i∈C(X∗)
1
k
ln
(
1
n+ 1
)
= ln
(
1
n+ 1
)
,
where we used the fact that maximum-clique equilibria are uniform strategies in their support (cf.
Section 2.5.2) and
n∑
j=0
X¯0(j) ln(X0(j)) =
n∑
j=0
X0(j) ln(X0(j)) =
n∑
j=0
1
n+ 1
ln
(
1
n+ 1
)
= ln
(
1
n+ 1
)
Since,
ln
(
1
n+ 1
)
>
(
1
2
)N
ln
(
1
n+ 1
)
− α(exp{α} + 1)
the basis of the induction holds. For the induction step, we assume (11) holds for some K < N
and we need to show that
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln(XK+1(i)) > (K + 2)
(
1
2
)N  n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln(XK+1(j))

 − α(exp{α} + 1). (12)
We are going to use the following inequalities: First (cf. Proposition 4),
ln(Xk+1(j)) ≥ ln(Xk(j)) + α((CXk)j −Xk · CXk)− α(exp{α} − 1)
and second (cf. Proposition 5),
ln(Xk+1(j)) ≤ ln(Xk(j)) + α((CXk)j −Xk · CXk).
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Applying these inequalities, we obtain on one hand∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln(XK+1(i)) ≥
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln(XK(i)) + α(X∗ · CXK −XK · CXK)− α(exp{α} − 1)
≥
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln(XK(i)) − α exp{α}
(since X∗ · CXK −XK · CXK ≥ −1 by the assumption C ∈ Cˆ) which implies∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln(XK+1(i)) + α exp{α} ≥
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln(XK(i)). (13)
On the other hand,
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln(XK+1(j)) ≤
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln(XK(j)) + α(X¯K+1 · CXK −XK · CXK)
≤
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln(XK(j)) + α
(since X¯K+1 · CXK −XK · CXK ≤ 1 by the assumption C ∈ Cˆ) which implies
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln(XK+1(j)) − α ≤
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln(XK(j))
and using the relation
X¯K+1 =
1
K + 2
XK+1 +
K + 1
K + 2
X¯K
we further obtain
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln(XK+1(j)) − α ≤ 1
K + 2
n∑
j=0
XK+1(j) ln(XK(j)) +
(
K + 1
K + 2
) n∑
j=0
X¯K(j) ln(XK(j))
which implies
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln(XK+1(j)) − α ≤
(
K + 1
K + 2
) n∑
j=0
X¯K(j) ln(XK(j))
which further implies
(K + 2)
(
1
2
)N  n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln(XK+1(j)) − α

 ≤
≤ (K + 2)
(
1
2
)N (K + 1
K + 2
) n∑
j=0
X¯K(j) ln(XK(j))

 =
15
= (K + 1)
(
1
2
)N  n∑
j=0
X¯K(j) ln(XK(j))

 (14)
and using (11), (13) and (14) imply
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln(XK+1(i)) + α exp{α} ≥ (K + 2)
(
1
2
)N  n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln(XK+1(j)) − α


which implies ∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln(XK+1(i)) + α exp{α} + α ≥
≥ (K + 2)
(
1
2
)N  n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln(XK+1(j))

 + α
(
1− (K + 2)
(
1
2
)N)
which further implies since the last term is nonnegative
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln(XK+1(i)) ≥ (K + 2)
(
1
2
)N  n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln(XK+1(j))

 − α(exp{α}+ 1)
showing (12) and completing the proof of the lemma.
Lemma 13. Under the assumptions of Lemma 12, we have that
X∗ · CX¯K − X¯K · CX¯K ≥ −exp{α}+ 1
K + 1
− 1
K + 2
Proof. Lemma 10 gives
X∗ · CX¯K − X¯K · CX¯K ≥ 1
α(K + 1)
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln
(
XK+1(i)
)−
− 1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
) − 1
K + 2
(15)
and Lemma 12 further gives
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln(XK(i)) > (K + 1)
(
1
2
)N  n∑
j=0
X¯K(j) ln(XK(j))

 − α(exp{α} + 1)
which implies, since we can choose N > K, that
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln(XK(i)) >
n∑
j=0
X¯K(j) ln(XK(j)) − α(exp{α}+ 1) (16)
Combining (15) and (16), we obtain
X∗ · CX¯K − X¯K · CX¯K ≥ −exp{α}+ 1
K + 1
− 1
K + 2
as claimed.
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Lemma 14. Under the assumptions of Lemma 12,
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln
(
XK+1(i)
) ≤ ln(1
k
)
+ ln
(
1−XK+1(0))
Proof. Using Jensen’s inequality, we have
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln
(
XK+1(i)
) ≤ ln

 ∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i)XK+1(i)

 =
and using the aforementioned in Section 2.5.2 property of maximum-clique equilibria that they are
uniform strategies in their support, we obtain
= ln

1
k
∑
i∈C(X∗)
XK+1(i)

 =
where k is the Nisan parameter which is equal to the maximum clique size. Using straight algebra
= ln
(
1
k
)
+ ln

 ∑
i∈C(X∗)
XK+1(i)

 . (17)
Letting J = {0, 1, . . . , n}/({0} ∪ C(X∗)), we have
XK+1(0) +
∑
i∈C(X∗)
XK+1(i) +
∑
j∈J
XK+1(j) = 1
which implies ∑
i∈C(X∗)
XK+1(i) +
∑
j∈J
XK+1(j) = 1−XK+1(0)
which further implies ∑
i∈C(X∗)
XK+1(i) ≤ 1−XK+1(0) (18)
Combining (17) and (18), we obtain
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln
(
XK+1(i)
) ≤ ln(1
k
)
+ ln
(
1−XK+1(0))
as claimed.
Theorem 1. Suppose E0 is a GNSS but not a GESS, which implies the existence of a maximum-
clique equilibrium, say X∗. Suppose X0 is the uniform distribution. Then there exists 0 < σ < 1
such that in
K =
⌊
n exp{−1}+ 1 + α
αθ
⌋
(19)
iterations (cf. Proposition 10), XK(0) ≤ σ. Furthermore, given α and θ, σ can be computed a
priori.
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Proof. Lemma 11 gives that
X∗ · CX¯K − X¯K · CX¯K ≤ 1
α(K + 1)
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln
(
XK+1(i)
)−
− 1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
+
1
K + 1
and Lemma 13 that
X∗ · CX¯K − X¯K · CX¯K ≥ −exp{α} + 1
K + 1
− 1
K + 2
.
Therefore,
−exp{α}+ 1
K + 1
− 1
K + 2
≤ 1
α(K + 1)
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln
(
XK+1(i)
)−
− 1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
+
1
K + 1
Lemma 14 gives
∑
i∈C(X∗)
X∗(i) ln
(
XK+1(i)
) ≤ ln(1
k
)
+ ln
(
1−XK+1(0))
which implies
−exp{α} + 1
K + 1
− 1
K + 2
≤ 1
α(K + 1)
(
ln
(
1
k
)
+ ln
(
1−XK+1(0)))−
− 1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
)
+
1
K + 1
(20)
and Proposition 8 gives
− 1
α(K + 1)
X¯K(j) ln
(
XK(j)
) ≤− 1
α(K + 1)
(
1
K + 1
K∑
k=0
Xk(j) ln
(
Xk(j)
))
+ (exp{α} − 1) + ρK ,
where ρ = 1/2, which implies
− 1
α(K + 2)
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
) ≤− 1
α(K + 2)
(
1
K + 2
K+1∑
k=0
Xk(j) ln
(
Xk(j)
))
+ (exp{α} − 1) + ρK+1,
which further implies
−X¯K+1(j) ln (XK+1(j)) ≤ −
(
1
K + 2
K+1∑
k=0
Xk(j) ln
(
Xk(j)
))
+ α(K + 2)
(
(exp{α} − 1) + ρK+1) ,
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which even further implies
− 1
α(K + 1)
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
) ≤ − 1
α(K + 1)
(
1
K + 2
K+1∑
k=0
Xk(j) ln
(
Xk(j)
))
+
+
(
K + 2
K + 1
)(
(exp{α} − 1) + ρK+1) ,
Using elementary calculus we obtain x ln(x) ≥ − exp{−1}, x ∈ [0, 1] and, thus, we obtain
− 1
α(K + 1)
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
) ≤ exp{−1}
α(K + 1)
+
(
K + 2
K + 1
)(
(exp{α} − 1) + ρK+1) .
Therefore,
− 1
α(K + 1)
n∑
j=0
X¯K+1(j) ln
(
XK+1(j)
) ≤ (n+ 1) exp{−1}
α(K + 1)
+ (n+ 1)
(
K + 2
K + 1
)(
(exp{α} − 1) + ρK+1) .
Combining with (20), we obtain
−exp{α} + 1
K + 1
− 1
K + 2
≤ 1
α(K + 1)
(
ln
(
1
k
)
+ ln
(
1−XK+1(0)))+
+
(n+ 1) exp{−1}
α(K + 1)
+ (n+ 1)
(
K + 2
K + 1
)(
(exp{α} − 1) + ρK+1)+ 1
K + 1
and rearranging
1
α(K + 1)
(
ln
(
1
k
)
+ ln
(
1−XK+1(0))) ≥ −(n+ 1) exp{−1}
α(K + 1)
− (n+ 1)
(
K + 2
K + 1
)(
(exp{α} − 1) + ρK+1)−
− 1
K + 1
− exp{α}+ 1
K + 1
− 1
K + 2
which implies
ln
(
1
k
)
+ ln
(
1−XK+1(0)) ≥ −(n+ 1) exp{−1} − (n+ 1)(K + 2)α ((exp{α} − 1) + ρK+1)−
−α− α(exp{α} + 1)− αK + 1
K + 2
and rearranging
ln
(
1−XK+1(0)) ≥ ln (k)− (n+ 1) exp{−1} − (n+ 1)(K + 2)α ((exp{α} − 1) + ρK+1)−
−α− α(exp{α} + 1)− αK + 1
K + 2
.
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Therefore,
XK+1(0) ≤− exp{ln (k)− (n+ 1) exp{−1} − (n+ 1)(K + 2)α ((exp{α} − 1) + ρK+1)−
−α− α(exp{α} + 1)− αK + 1
K + 2
}
+ 1 (21)
Substituting the expression forK in the statement of the lemma, that is, (19), on the right-hand-side
of (21), we obtain σ. It can be easily verified using straight algebra that ln(n) < (n+ 1) exp{−1},
n ≥ 2, which implies that the argument of the exponential function in (21) is negative. Therefore,
0 < exp
{
ln (k)− (n + 1) exp{−1} − (n + 1)(K + 2)α ((exp{α} − 1) + ρK+1)−
−α− α(exp{α} + 1)− αK + 1
K + 2
}
< 1
which implies using straight algebra that
0 < − exp{ln (k)− (n+ 1) exp{−1} − (n+ 1)(K + 2)α ((exp{α} − 1) + ρK+1)−
−α− α(exp{α} + 1)− αK + 1
K + 2
}
+ 1 < 1
That is, 0 < σ < 1. This completes the proof.
5 On the “minimum positive gap” of a symmetric bimatrix game
Our goal in this section is to define a concept that is able to transform the aforementioned fully
polynomial-time approximation scheme based on Hedge to a polynomial computation algorithm in
the Nisan game. But let us start more generally with the setting of symmetric bimatrix games:
Let C ∈ C and X ∈ X(C). Then we define the gap G(X) of X as
G(X) ≡ (CX)max − (CX)min.
Our motivation for introducing this definition has as follows: Every pure or mixed strategy of a
symmetric bimatrix game C has a gap (except for equalizers). One way to define a “minimum gap”
is as the minimum over all strategies of C. But C has sub-games. The sub-games that are carriers
of fixed points have minimum gap of zero. Sub-games that do not carry fixed points also have
a positive minimum gap (as sub-games). It is meaningful that in the definition of the minimum
gap we take the sub-games into account and here is why: Let γmin be the minimum gap of C. I
claim that a γmin/2-well-supported equilibrium, call it Xˆ, lies inside the carrier of an equilibrium
(which we can readily compute knowing the carrier). Let us assume for the sake of contradiction
that the carrier of Xˆ does not carry an equilibrium (which is an equalizer of the carrier). Then
there is a gap equal to or greater than γmin (inside the carrier), which is an impossibility given that
γmin/2-well-supported equilibrium exists. Hence the claim.
In the sequel, we are concerned with the minimum gap in the Nisan game. To that end, we
first need a lemma:
Lemma 15. Let C ∈ C and assume C does not have an equalizer. Then the minimum gap of C is
attained on the boundary of X(C).
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Proof. We consider the optimization problem
min{(CX)max − (CX)min|X ∈ X(C)}
which we may write as the following linear program
min{ǫ|(CX)i − (CX)j ≤ ǫ, i, j ∈ K(C),X ∈ X(C)}.
The KKT conditions for this linear program read as follows:
Stationarity:


1
0
...
0

+
∑
ij
µij
[ −1
CTi − CTj
]
+
n∑
k=1
µk


0
0
...
−1
...
0


+ λ


0
1
...
1

 = 0
Primal feasibility:
(CX)i − (CX)j ≤ ǫ, i, j ∈ K(C),X ∈ X(C)
Dual feasibility:
µij ≥ 0, µk ≥ 0
Complementary slackness:
µij ((CX)i − (CX)j − ǫ) = 0, i, j ∈ K(C)
µkX(k) = 0, k ∈ K(C)
The previous conditions imply that ∑
ij
µij = 1. (22)
Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that, for all k = 1, . . . , n, we have that µk = 0. Then
∑
ij
µij(C
T
i − CTj ) + λ


1
...
1

 = 0. (23)
Right-multiplying with an optimal solution, say X, we obtain∑
ij
µij((CX)i − (CX)j) + λ = 0
which implies from the complementary slackness conditions that∑
ij
µijǫ+ λ = 0
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and combining with (22), we obtain
λ = −ǫ.
Substituting in (23), we obtain
∑
ij
µij(C
T
i − CTj ) = ǫ


1
...
1

 . (24)
Under the assumption C does not have an equalizer, we have ǫ > 0. Furthermore, letting X be an
optimizer, we have from complementary slackness that
(CX)i − (CX)j < ǫ⇒ µij = 0.
A necessary condition for (24) to have a solution is that, for all Y ∈ Rn,
∑
ij
µij((CY )i − (CY )j) = ǫ
(
n∑
k=1
Y (k)
)
. (25)
If C is singular, any Y 6= 0 such that CY = 0 does not satisfy (25) (since ǫ > 0). If C is nonsingular,
any Y such that CY = λ1 does not satisfy (25) (again since ǫ > 0). Therefore, (24) is infeasible.
Thus, ∃k such that µk > 0, and complementary slackness gives X(k) = 0, and the lemma.
Theorem 2. The minimum positive gap of Cˆ is at least 1/2.
Proof. I will show this by induction on the number of vertices (denoted n) of the corresponding
undirected graph. If n = 2, the minimum positive gap is attained at a pure strategy and it is
easily verified by construction of the Nisan-Bomze payoff matrix that it is 1/2. The induction
hypothesis is that the statement in the theorem holds for n − 1 vertices. To prove the statement
when we introduce another vertex so that the number of vertices becomes n, we need to consider
the minimum positive gap of the entire (basis) game and how the introduction of a vertex and
corresponding edges affects the minimum positive gap of sub-games. The number of vertices in the
new sub-games is less than n and by the induction hypothesis the minimum positive gap over all
sub-games is at least 1/2. Note now that if there is a clique of size n (which implies the presence of
an equalizer in the basis game), then the minimum gap of the basis game is equal to zero. Let us
therefore assume that Cˆ does not have an equalizer. Let X¯ be a boundary strategy, which implies
that there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that X¯(i) = 0. Call the corresponding coface where X¯ lies in
Cˆ−i. Let G(X¯ |Cˆ−i) be the gap of X¯ as a strategy of Cˆ−i. Then I claim that G(X¯ |Cˆ) ≥ G(X¯ |Cˆ−i).
Indeed
max
j∈K(Cˆ)
{(CX¯)i} ≥ max
j∈K(Cˆ)/{i}
{(CX¯)i}
and
min
j∈K(Cˆ)
{(CX¯)i} ≤ min
j∈K(Cˆ)/{i}
{(CX¯)i},
which proves the claim. Invoking Lemma 15 and the induction hypothesis completes the proof.
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Theorem 3. The minimum positive gap of
∆(σ′) = {X(C)|X(0) ≤ σ′},
where 0 ≤ σ′ < 1, is at least
1
2
(1− σ′).
Proof. By Theorem 2, the bound holds for Cˆ (corresponding to the case σ′ = 0). We need only
therefore consider sub-games formed by E0 and a corresponding sub-game of Cˆ, say Cˆ
′. If Cˆ ′
supports a maximum-clique equilibrium, then the minimum gap in the new game is zero. Therefore,
suppose Cˆ ′ does not support a maximum-clique equilibrium. Let
Y = ǫE0 + (1− ǫ)X,
where X is a strategy of Cˆ ′ padded with a zero at position 0 and ǫ ∈ [0, σ′]. Then
CY = ǫCE0 + (1− ǫ)Cˆ ′X.
Since E0 is an equalizer, the first term does not affect the gap of the second term. That is,
(CY )max − (CY )min = (ǫCE0 + (1− ǫ)Cˆ ′X)max − (ǫCE0 + (1− ǫ)Cˆ ′X)min
= (1− ǫ)((Cˆ ′X)max − (Cˆ ′X)min).
Therefore, the gap of Y is linear in ǫ, and, thus, the minimum positive gap of domain ∆(σ′) is at
least
min
ǫ∈[0,σ′]
{
1
2
(1− ǫ)
}
=
1
2
(1− σ′).
Hence the theorem.
6 A polynomial algorithm for the maximum clique
6.1 Specification of the algorithm
The algorithm descends the Nisan parameter k until a maximum-clique equilibrium is found. In this
strategy, we also need a test to verify that a maximum-clique equilibrium does not exist. To look
for a maximum clique equilibrium we appropriately configure the parameters of the equilibrium
approximation algorithm. The parameters we control are α, θ (cf. Proposition 10), and the initial
condition X0 (which is an interior strategy). To simplify matters we set θ = exp{α} − 1 so that
the only parameters at our disposal are α and X0. To further simplify matters, we assume X0 is
the uniform distribution. Then K, the number of iterations until termination, and σ are functions
of α, so we write σ(α) and K(α) for clarity. We set the approximation error equal to
(ǫ/2)2
8
where ǫ =
1
2
(1− σ(α)).
That is, we choose a target approximation error that depends on our choice of α. Given α and
assuming X0 is the uniform strategy in
K ≡ K(α) =
⌊
n exp{−1}+ 1 + α
α(exp{α} − 1)
⌋
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iterations, the equilibrium approximation error
(CX¯K(α))max − X¯K(α) · CX¯K(α)
is not greater than (cf. Proposition 10)(
K(α) + 2
K(α) + 1
)
(n+ 1)(exp{α} − 1) +
(
K(α) + 2
K(α) + 1
)
(n+ 1)ρK(α) + (exp{α} − 1).
To achieve the target equilibrium approximation error, we thus need to choose α such that
1
32
(
1
2
)2
(1− σ(α))2 ≥
≥
((
K(α) + 2
K(α) + 1
)
(n+ 1)(exp{α} − 1) +
(
K(α) + 2
K(α) + 1
)
(n+ 1)ρK(α) + (exp{α} − 1)
)
(26)
where (invoking Theorem 1)
σ(α) =− exp
{
ln (k)− (n+ 1) exp{−1} − (n+ 1)(K(α) + 2)α
(
(exp{α} − 1) + ρK(α)+1
)
−
−α− α(exp{α}+ 1)− αK(α) + 1
K(α) + 2
}
+ 1.
Let αˆ be a learning rate value that solves (26). If on attainment of the approximation error
1
32
(
1
2
(1− σ(αˆ))
)2
we have that X¯K(αˆ)(0) > σ(αˆ), the algorithm concludes that E0 is a GESS for the corresponding
Nisan parameter and proceeds to the next round. If on attainment of the aforementioned approxi-
mation error X¯K(αˆ)(0) ≤ σ(αˆ) the algorithm concludes that E0 is a GNSS but not a GESS, which
implies that the corresponding Nisan parameter is equal to the maximum-clique size. To compute
a maximum clique, a well-supported equilibrium is computed (cf. Proposition 1) that is guaran-
teed to be in the interior of the carrier of an equilibrium line between E0 and a maximum-clique
equilibrium. A maximum-clique equilibrium can be readily computed from the well-supported equi-
librium the algorithm computes (as the support of a maximum-clique equilibrium is known). On
computation of a maximum-clique equilibrium the algorithm concludes.
6.2 Correctness proof
Theorem 4. Suppose E0 is a GNSS but not a GESS, which implies the existence of a maximum
clique equilibrium. Suppose the equilibrium approximation error is set to (ǫ/2)2/8 = ǫ2/32 where
ǫ =
1
2
(1− σ)
and σ ≡ σ(αˆ) where αˆ solves (26). Let X¯K be the iterate of the sequence of empirical averages
that is generated on attainment of this approximation error and let Xˆ be an ǫ/2−well− supported
equilibrium generated out of X¯K (cf. Proposition 1). Then Xˆ lies in the interior of the carrier of
the equilibrium line connecting E0 and a maximum clique equilibrium, say, X
∗.
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Proof. Theorem 1 implies that X¯K(0) ≤ σ and by construction of Xˆ from X¯K (see [Chen et al.,
2009, Lemma 3.2]) we have Xˆ(0) ≤ σ + ǫ/8. This eliminates the possibility that Xˆ = E0 since
σ +
1
8
ǫ = σ +
1
16
(1− σ) = 15
16
σ +
1
16
< 1,
where the last inequality (using σ < 1) follows from Theorem 1. Furthermore, X¯K(0) > 0 since
Hedge cannot escape the interior of the probability simplex in a finite number of steps. Moreover
(CX¯K)max − X¯K · CX¯K ≤ 1
8
( ǫ
2
)2
which implies
(CX¯K)max − X¯K · CX¯K ≤ ǫ
2
which further implies
(CX¯K)max − E0 · CX¯K ≤ ǫ
2
and rearranging we obtain
E0 · CX¯K ≥ (CX¯K)max − ǫ
2
.
Therefore, by construction of the well-supported equilibrium Xˆ(0) > X¯K(0). Therefore Xˆ 6∈ C(X∗).
Let us now assume for the sake of contradiction that the carrier of Xˆ does not carry an equilibrium
line having E0 and X
∗ as terminal points. Then, by Theorem 3, there is a minimum gap equal to
or greater than (
1− σ − ǫ
8
) 1
2
= ǫ− ǫ
16
>
ǫ
2
inside the intersection of the carrier of Xˆ with domain ∆(σ + ǫ/8), which is an impossibility given
that an ǫ/2-well-supported equilibrium exists inside this intersection. This completes the proof.
Theorem 5. Let Xˆ be as in Theorem 4. Then C(Xˆ)/{E0} is the carrier of X∗.
Proof. Since the elements of the equilibrium line with terminal points E0 and X
∗ are convex
combinations of E0 and X
∗, it follows that C(Xˆ)/{E0} is the carrier of X∗.
Theorem 6. Suppose E0 is a GESS and the equilibrium approximation error is set to ǫ
2/32 where
ǫ =
1
2
(1− σ)
and σ ≡ σ(αˆ) where αˆ solves (26). Let X¯K be the iterate of the sequence of empirical averages that
is generated on attainment of this approximation error. Then X¯K(0) > σ.
Proof. Let us assume for the sake of contradiction that X¯K(0) ≤ σ. Let Xˆ be an ǫ/2-well-supported
equilibrium generated out of X¯K . Then by construction of Xˆ from X¯K we have Xˆ(0) ≤ σ + ǫ/8,
which implies by an argument analogous to the previous proof and Xˆ 6= E0. Furthermore, in
a fashion again similar to the previous proof, since the carrier of Xˆ does not carry an interior
equilibrium there is a minimum gap equal to or greater than(
1− σ − ǫ
8
) 1
2
= ǫ− ǫ
16
>
ǫ
2
inside the intersection of the carrier of Xˆ with domain ∆(σ + ǫ/8), which is an impossibility given
that an ǫ/2-well-supported equilibrium exists inside this intersection. Therefore, X¯K(0) > σ.
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6.3 Finding a suitable value for the learning rate α
We are looking for a value of α that satisfies inequality (26), which we repeat here for convenience:
1
32
(
1
2
)2
(1− σ(α))2 ≥
≥
(
K(α) + 2
K(α) + 1
)
(n+ 1)(exp{α} − 1) +
(
K(α) + 2
K(α) + 1
)
(n+ 1)ρK(α) + (exp{α} − 1).
We are going to propose a numerical method that solves this inequality (in the sense of finding
a value of α that satisfies it) in polynomial time. To that end, we are going to obtain a stricter
inequality that is, however, simpler as follows: On one hand, we have
(1− σ(α))2 =exp
{
2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)(K(α) + 2)α
(
(exp{α} − 1) + ρK(α)+1
)
−
−2α− 2α(exp{α} + 1)− 2αK(α) + 1
K(α) + 2
}
which, since
K(α) + 1
K(α) + 2
< 1,
implies that
≥ exp
{
2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)(K(α) + 2)α
(
(exp{α} − 1) + ρK(α)+1
)
−
−2α− 2α(exp{α} + 1)− 2α}
which further implies using straight algebra that
≥ exp{2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)(K(α) + 2)α(exp{α} − 1)−
− 2(n + 1)(K(α) + 2)αρK(α)+1 − 4α− 2α(exp{α} + 1)}
≥ exp{2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)K(α)α(exp{α} − 1)− 4(n + 1)α(exp{α} − 1)−
− 2(n + 1)(K(α) + 2)αρK(α)+1 − 4α− 2α(exp{α}+ 1)}
which, since
K(α) =
⌊
n exp{−1}+ 1 + α
α(exp{α} − 1)
⌋
,
even further implies
≥ exp{2 ln (k)− 2(n+ 1) exp{−1} − 2(n + 1)(n exp{−1} + 1 + α)− 4(n + 1)α(exp{α} − 1)−
− 2(n+ 1)(K(α) + 2)αρK(α)+1 − 4α− 2α(exp{α}+ 1)}
On the other hand, we have(
K(α) + 2
K(α) + 1
)
(n+ 1)(exp{α} − 1) +
(
K(α) + 2
K(α) + 1
)
(n+ 1)ρK(α) + (exp{α} − 1)
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≤ 2(n + 1)(exp{α} − 1) + 2(n + 1)ρK(α) + (exp{α} − 1)
It, therefore, suffices to find α such that
1
128
exp {2 ln (k)− 2(n+ 1) exp{−1} − 2(n + 1)(n exp{−1} + 1)} ≥
≥ exp
{
2(n+ 1)α + 4(n+ 1)α(exp{α} − 1) + 2(n + 1)(K(α) + 2)αρK(α)+1 + 4α+ 2α(exp{α} + 1)
}
×
×
(
2(n + 1)(exp{α} − 1) + 2(n + 1)ρK(α) + (exp{α} − 1)
)
The expression on the right-hand-side is not continuous as a function of α. To obtain a smooth
right-hand-side, let us use the following notation:
Kˆ(α) ≡ n exp{−1}+ 1 + α
α(exp{α} − 1) .
Then K(α) ≤ Kˆ(α) and K(α) ≥ Kˆ(α) − 1. Thus, it suffices to find α such that
1
128
exp {2 ln (k)− 2(n+ 1) exp{−1} − 2(n + 1)(n exp{−1} + 1)} ≥
≥ exp
{
2(n+ 1)α + 4(n+ 1)α(exp{α} − 1) + 2(n + 1)(Kˆ(α) + 2)αρKˆ(α) + 4α+ 2α(exp{α}+ 1)
}
×
×
(
2(n+ 1)(exp{α} − 1) + (n+ 1)ρKˆ(α) + (exp{α} − 1)
)
The expression on the right-hand-side is now a smooth and strictly increasing function of α. Fur-
thermore, the limit as α→ 0 is equal to 0. Therefore, there exists an interval (0, α¯] of values of the
learning rate α that satisfy the previous inequality and, therefore, also (26). To find an α in the
range (0, α¯] we can use the Newton-Raphson method to solve the equation
1
2
· 1
128
exp {2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)(n exp{−1}+ 1)} =
= exp
{
2(n+ 1)α + 4(n+ 1)α(exp{α} − 1) + 2(n + 1)(Kˆ(α) + 2)αρKˆ(α) + 4α+ 2α(exp{α}+ 1)
}
×
×
(
2(n+ 1)(exp{α} − 1) + (n+ 1)ρKˆ(α) + (exp{α} − 1)
)
(27)
with precision
1
4
· 1
128
exp {2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)(n exp{−1}+ 1)} (28)
using a small initial value, for example, 0.5. It is easily shown using standard properties of the
Newton-Raphson method that the time complexity of solving equation (27) with precision (28) and
arbitrary initialization is polynomial in n and k.
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6.4 Complexity
The number of rounds (each round corresponding to a particular value of the descending Nisan
parameter k) is at most n−k∗+1, where k∗ is the size of a maximum clique. In each round, we must
first compute a suitable value for the learning rate α given the corresponding Nisan parameter. As
mentioned above, such a value can be computed in polynomial time. The next step is to iterate
Hedge and depending on the probability mass of strategy E0 to possibly compute an approximate
well-supported equilibrium from the empirical average of the iterates. This computation can be
performed in polynomial time (cf. Proposition 1). It remains to upper bound the number of
iterations of Hedge (to either decide that a maximum-clique equilibrium does not exist or to compute
one if it exists using the approximate well-supported equilibrium we have computed). To obtain
the bound on the number of iterations we are going to use the following formula
K(αˆ) =
⌊
n exp{−1}+ 1 + αˆ
αˆ(exp{αˆ} − 1)
⌋
≤
⌊
n exp{−1}+ 1 + αˆ
αˆ2
⌋
, (29)
where we have used the inequality exp{αˆ} ≥ 1 + αˆ. To bound K(αˆ) as a function of n, we will
obtain a lower bound and an upper bound on αˆ.
6.4.1 A lower bound on αˆ
The Newton-Raphson method converges to a αˆ that satisfies the equation
cˆ · 1
128
exp {2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)(n exp{−1}+ 1)} =
= exp
{
2(n+ 1)αˆ + 4(n+ 1)αˆ(exp{αˆ} − 1) + 2(n + 1)(Kˆ(αˆ) + 2)αˆρKˆ(αˆ) + 4αˆ+ 2αˆ(exp{αˆ}+ 1)
}
×
×
(
2(n+ 1)(exp{αˆ} − 1) + (n+ 1)ρKˆ(αˆ) + (exp{αˆ} − 1)
)
.
for some cˆ ∈ [1/4, 3/4]. Then
cˆ · 1
128
exp {2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)(n exp{−1}+ 1)} ≥
≥ exp {2(n + 1)αˆ+ 4(n + 1)αˆ(exp{αˆ} − 1) + 4αˆ + 2αˆ(exp{αˆ}+ 1)}×
× (2(n + 1)(exp{αˆ} − 1) + (exp{αˆ} − 1))
which is equivalent to
cˆ · 1
128
exp {2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)(n exp{−1}+ 1)} ≥
≥ exp {2(n + 1)αˆ+ 4(n + 1)αˆ(exp{αˆ} − 1) + 4αˆ + 2αˆ(exp{αˆ}+ 1)}×
×(2n + 3)(exp{αˆ} − 1)
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which, using the inequality exp{αˆ} ≥ 1 + αˆ and rearranging, implies
cˆ · 1
128
· 1
2n+ 3
exp {2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)(n exp{−1}+ 1)} ≥
≥ exp {ln(αˆ) + 2(n + 1)αˆ+ 4(n + 1)αˆ(exp{αˆ} − 1) + 4αˆ + 2αˆ(exp{αˆ}+ 1)}
which, using the inequalities ln(αˆ) > (αˆ− 1)/α and exp{αˆ} ≥ 1 + αˆ implies
cˆ · 1
128
· 1
2n+ 3
exp {2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)(n exp{−1}+ 1)} ≥
≥ exp
{
αˆ− 1
αˆ
+ 2(n + 1)αˆ+ 4(n + 1)αˆ2 + 4αˆ+ 2αˆ(αˆ+ 2)
}
which implies
cˆ · 1
128
· 1
2n+ 3
exp {2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)(n exp{−1}+ 1)} ≥
≥ exp
{
αˆ− 1
αˆ
+ 2(n + 5)αˆ
}
which, taking logarithms on both sides, implies
ln
(
cˆ · 1
128
· 1
2n + 3
)
+ 2 ln (k)− 2(n+ 1) exp{−1} − 2(n + 1)(n exp{−1} + 1) ≥
≥ αˆ− 1
αˆ
+ 2(n + 5)αˆ
which, multiplying both sides by αˆ, implies
αˆ
(
ln
(
cˆ · 1
128
· 1
2n + 3
)
+ 2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)(n exp{−1}+ 1)
)
≥
≥ αˆ− 1 + 2(n + 5)αˆ2
which is equivalent to
2(n + 5)αˆ2 − αˆ
(
1 + ln
(
cˆ · 1
128
· 1
2n+ 3
)
+ 2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)(n exp{−1}+ 1)
)
− 1 ≥ 0
which implies
αˆ ≥ −b+
√
∆
2a
(30)
where
b = −
(
1 + ln
(
cˆ · 1
128
· 1
2n+ 3
)
+ 2 ln (k)− 2(n+ 1) exp{−1} − 2(n + 1)(n exp{−1} + 1)
)
,
a = 2(n + 5),
and
∆ = b2 − 4ac
where
c = −1.
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6.4.2 An upper bound on αˆ
As above, the Newton-Raphson method converges to a αˆ that satisfies the equation
cˆ · 1
128
exp {2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)(n exp{−1}+ 1)} =
= exp
{
2(n+ 1)αˆ + 4(n+ 1)αˆ(exp{αˆ} − 1) + 2(n + 1)(Kˆ(αˆ) + 2)αˆρKˆ(αˆ) + 4αˆ+ 2αˆ(exp{αˆ}+ 1)
}
×
×
(
2(n+ 1)(exp{αˆ} − 1) + (n+ 1)ρKˆ(αˆ) + (exp{αˆ} − 1)
)
.
for some cˆ ∈ [1/4, 3/4]. Then
cˆ · 1
128
exp {2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)(n exp{−1}+ 1)} ≥
≥ exp {2(n + 1)αˆ+ 4(n + 1)αˆ(exp{αˆ} − 1) + 4αˆ + 2αˆ(exp{αˆ}+ 1)}×
× (2(n + 1)(exp{αˆ} − 1) + (exp{αˆ} − 1))
which is equivalent to
cˆ · 1
128
exp {2 ln (k)− 2(n + 1) exp{−1} − 2(n+ 1)(n exp{−1}+ 1)} ≥
≥ exp {2(n + 1)αˆ+ 4(n + 1)αˆ(exp{αˆ} − 1) + 4αˆ + 2αˆ(exp{αˆ}+ 1)}×
×(2n + 3)(exp{αˆ} − 1)
which, since
exp {2 ln (k)− 2(n+ 1) exp{−1} − 2(n + 1)(n exp{−1} + 1)} < 1
and
exp {2(n+ 1)αˆ + 4(n+ 1)αˆ(exp{αˆ} − 1) + 4αˆ+ 2αˆ(exp{αˆ}+ 1)} > 1
implies
αˆ ≤ cˆ · 1
128
· 1
2n + 3
. (31)
6.4.3 Conclusion
(29), (30), and (31) imply K(αˆ), that is, the number of iterations required to either compute a
maximum-clique equilibrium or to decide that a maximum-clique equilibrium does not exist, is
upper bounded by a ratio of polynomials in ln(k), ln(n), and n. We have thus devised a polynomial
algorithm to compute a maximum clique, implying that P = NP.
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